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This study looks at share price behavior in reaction to corporate announcement of directors’ intention to purchase 
shares from secondary market. Corporate announcement dates have been taken from share purchase notifications 
given to the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) authority by the companies listed on the DSE from May 1, 2013 to 
April 30, 2014. Event study methodology has been employed to test abnormal returns on the announcement day 
and consecutive five days thereafter. The results show that average abnormal returns (AAR) are positive over 
first two days suggesting share prices increase when directors announce their intention to purchase shares. The t-
test employed to examine the significance of cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) revealed that abnormal 
returns are significant on first three (two) days at 5% (1%) level confirming the hypothesis that insider purchase 
announcement affects the DSE market over a short span. 
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1. Introduction 
Studies on reaction of emerging markets to insider trading are relatively sparse compared to those related to 
developed markets. Trading regulations in new emerging markets are often not stringent and it may be possible 
for insiders to trade based on material non-public information. International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (2003) reports that insider trading, as defined by Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission, 
refers to buying, selling or otherwise transferring of securities by an insider based on the undisclosed price 
sensitive information of the issuer company. However, in the absence of any undisclosed price sensitive 
information insiders can trade on secondary market provided they notify stock exchanges in advance. 
The objective of this study is to observe share price reactions over a short span when directors make 
announcements of their intention to purchase shares from stock market. No inference about market efficiency is 
being made here and therefore the event window for testing reaction has been kept short on purpose. The Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) trading regulations require written notification to be communicated to the DSE authority 
by every sponsor [sic] of his or her intention to trade shares at least four working days before the sponsor’s 
execution of the trade. According to Chapter XII paragraph 43(7) of The Listing Regulations of Dhaka Stock 
Exchange Limited (1996) the word “sponsor” has been meant to include director, promoter, officer or other 
insider of listed companies. Unlike in USA where insider trading must be notified after the deal within two 
working days in Form 4 of SEC, the DSE regulations require notification before the deal. Thus this study is 
focused on price reactions on the notification date i.e. event day and the purchase period subsequent to the 
notification date. In particular, this study is to find out abnormal returns and their statistical significance on the 
corporate announcement of directors’ intention to purchase shares and on the consecutive five days thereafter.  
Since all notifications given by directors of listed companies are flashed in DSE news clips and 
websites immediately, any announcement of share purchase intention by a director would provide other investors 
in the market a potential source of information. In an emerging market like DSE where there is no report so far 
of any sound evidence of semi-strong form of efficiency, outsiders can only occasionally utilize the news about 
insiders’ share purchase efforts to their benefit. Alternatively, it can also happen that insiders are timing their 
purchase schedule to their own benefit by utilizing superior prediction ability compared to outsiders. 
   
2. Literature Review 
Market reactions to insider trading, both short and long term, have been studied globally and in both developed 
and emerging markets. While long term studies can also shed light on market efficiency short term studies 
mostly focus on abnormal price spikes in a short span around the insider trading dates. 
Givoly and Palmon (1985) examined insider trading in the companies listed on AMEX from 1973 to 
1985 and found that abnormal returns are generated when outside shareholders follow inside shareholders 
investment behaviour. Similarly Benesh and Pari (1987) also looked at long run trend and concluded that buying 
and holding securities for a year or longer period based on recent inside share purchase news would provide 
abnormal returns for outsiders. However, Seyhun (1986) concluded in his study that although insiders can 
successfully predict stock price and benefit from abnormal returns, outsiders cannot use insider trading 
information successfully due to market efficiency. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) dealt with data from three 
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exchanges over 1975 to 1995 but did not find any significant abnormal returns on or around insider trading dates. 
But they found abnormal returns being earned by insiders over longer horizon. Interestingly, they also found 
inside purchase to be relatively more informative than inside sales. That inside purchase has more impact on the 
market than inside sales has also been reported by Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003). This has prompted me 
to focus on the purchase side of insider trading in this research undertaken. 
Studies which focus on short term abnormal returns mostly use event study methodology and test of 
significance. Aktas, de Bodt et al. (2007) studied significance of abnormal returns over short term as well as over 
a longer horizon using data from Euronext Amsterdam exchange. On the short span they looked at cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) over two, three and five days after and around insider trading. Their findings 
suggested some significance of CAAR over short span, although they found CAAR over longer horizon more 
significant using t-tests. This, in contrast to Lakonishok and Lee (2001), shows that there can be statistically 
significant abnormal returns around trading dates. But they refrain from calling it economically significant. 
Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002) looked at abnormal returns twenty days before and after the 
trading in shares by directors of companies in the U.K. Their study also found positive gross abnormal returns 
emerging from trades around directors’ trade dates.  
Since the purpose my paper is to look at possible abnormal returns over a short span on event day and 
immediately thereafter, it is necessary to address whether the DSE market has some form of efficiency to process 
publicly available information.  
An efficient market is generally considered one where it is not possible to earn abnormal profit based on 
any publicly available information. If abnormal profits can be reaped for a brief period then the market is 
considered semi-strongly efficient. If the DSE market is weak then future prices cannot be forecasted in theory 
although practitioners of technical analysis would rely on financial modelling of all sorts. Nevertheless, in a 
weakly efficient market occasional abnormal return is very much possible based on publicly available sensitive 
information, if not based on historical prices alone.  
One of the earliest studies on market efficiency of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) was done by Alam 
(1999) using variance ratio test on monthly returns using 1986-1995 data. The results showed that the DSE 
follows a random walk suggesting weak form efficiency. Mobarek (2000) used daily price index data of 1988-
1997 but found no efficiency using auto-correlation tests and runs. 
Maxim, Miti and Arifuzzaman (2013) observed random walk of returns after the 2010 market crash but 
non-randomness prior to that. This study rejects weak efficiency but suggests lower degree of efficiency due to 
loose regulatory disclosure requirements, discontinuity and thinness in trading. 
Test of CAPM in Dhaka Stock Exchange was done by Ali, Islam and Chowdhury (2010) by 
investigating relation between risk (beta) and return using classical Fama and Macbeth (1973) approach. Their 
findings revealed a weak risk return relation and limited practical application of CAPM. 
The above studies on EMH suggest that it may be possible to see abnormal price spikes on occasions 
due to publicly circulating information in an emerging market like the DSE. Although there are quite a few event 
studies relating to dividends declaration and market reaction, no studies have been found to date relating to 
directors’ share purchase. There is one study on abnormal price spike upon misinformation circulating in the 
market. Ahsan, Gani & Hasan (2013) studied market reaction to the publicity of fake news relating to banking 
industry and found volatile spikes in security prices and market index of the DSE. However, this study was 
limited to descriptive statistics and no test of significance was done.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The sample event dates have been collected over one year period from May 1, 2013 to April 30, 2014 inclusive. 
The sample period could not go before May 1, 2013 because the market index used in this study was the DSE 
broad index (DSEX) which was launched by the DSE starting January 28, 2013. This new index is an 
improvement over the previous index called the DSE general index (DGEN). The improvement has been made 
in collaboration with an expert team of the Standard and Poor (S&P).  Due to a possible disconnect between 
DSEX and DGEN the latter was not used in this study. Only the DSEX has been used as a market index. 
Therefore, in order to give sufficient length of time for the estimation period plus twenty days of interval 
between the estimation window and the event window, the start of the event window has been decided to be May 
1, 2013. All of the listed shares on the DSE have been explored for announcements of desired share purchase by 
directors.  
The final sample size consists of forty-nine companies. If there was a second announcement by a same 
company care has been taken to ensure that the gap between two announcements is at least twenty-five days in 
order to consider the second announcement as another observation in the sample. Otherwise only the first 
announcement date was selected. Announcements for purchase of preferred shares or other special shares not 
being traded in the secondary market have been excluded from the sample event dates. Purchases of shares due 
to exercise of options or pursuant to court orders have also been excluded.  
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The source of sample event dates was DSE news clips picked from the website of Stock Bangladesh Limited. 
Daily closing prices of firms and daily indexed price of DSE broad index (DSEX) were purchased directly from 
the DSE library.  
 
3.1 Selection of Event Windows and Estimation Windows  
Short but several event windows have been designed for testing the significance of abnormal returns.  Since the 
DSE regulation requires directors and other sponsors to complete their purchase of shares within four days from 
the announcement dates, six event windows were considered here. This covers the four days stipulated by the 
DSE plus announcement or event date, and one additional day immediately after the stipulated four days. In 
other words, six event windows have been considered for each firm in the sample as follows: [0, 0], [0, 1], [0, 2], 
[0, 3], [0, 4] and [0, 5]. Here 0 refers to the event day i.e. announcement day, the numbers 1 through 4 refer to 
four days mandated by the DSE to complete the purchase, and 5 is the day immediately after the purchase period. 
The interval between the event windows and the estimation windows was [-20, -1] for all the sample firms. 
The estimation window for calculating parameters of regression was [Jan 28, 2013, -21]. Since the 
proxy for the market index (DSEX) starts from Jan 28, 2013, the date cannot go before that. The number of days 
in the estimation window varied from firm to firm. But for no firm in the sample, the number of days was less 
than forty. Thus the size of the days was sufficiently large for the purpose. 
 
3.2 Description of Model and Procedures  
The choice of a model in this study is less of a concern because model selection has less impact on results where 
event windows are short. Market model has been used here for estimating the parameters and subsequently 
calculating the abnormal returns. Market model relates the return of a given stock linearly to the return of the 
overall market portfolio. It is widely used in event studies where abnormal returns accumulated over time are 
tested for significance. 
First, daily returns were calculated from daily closing prices of each of the securities in the sample. For 
example, the return on day t of security i would be Rit = [Pit – Pit-1]/Pit-1 where Pit = price of security i on day t and 
Pit-1 = price of security i on day t-1. Similarly, daily market returns Rmt were also calculated from the DSEX 
index. Then regressions were run over the estimation period for each security i with market returns, Rmt, as 
independent variables and security returns, Rit, as dependent variables. This has yielded the parameters αi and βi 
of security i, which are intercept and beta or slope of security i respectively. These two parameters were then 
used to calculate the abnormal return for each security i on each day over the event period. The calculation was 
done with the equation  ARit = Rit - αi - βi (Rmt).   
Once abnormal returns of all the sample securities have been found, they were averaged over each day 
in the event period as AARt or average abnormal returns on day t. The calculation was a cross-sectional average 
of all the securities in the sample N for each t as follows: 
         N 
     AARt = Σ ARit /N 
        i=1 
Finally the sum of AARt was calculated as CAARt or cumulative average abnormal return over the event 
window. Thus the calculation of CAARt was as follows: 
      T 
     CAARt = Σ AARt 
      t=0 
Here T refers to the numerical value of last day in the event window. Thus for window [0, 3] the summation of 
AARt is over four days with t=0 and T=3. Since we have stipulated six event windows CAARt was calculated for 
all six windows. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis Testing  
Since CAARt calculated above represents a reduced single statistic for all abnormal returns in each of the six 
event windows, the t-test has been employed here to examine whether CAAR is significant or not in 
corresponding six event windows. 
In particular, null and alternative hypotheses have been formulated for the testing purpose. The null 
hypothesis is that the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is zero or insignificant on the announcement 
event of share purchase intention by directors, sponsors and other insiders of companies listed on DSE. On the 
flip side, the alternative hypothesis is that the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) differs significantly 
from zero on the announcement event of share purchase intention by directors, sponsors and other insiders of 
companies listed on the DSE. The hypotheses can be briefly expressed as: 
     HO: CAAR = 0 
     HA: CAAR ≠ 0 
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The t-statistic has been computed by dividing the difference between CAARt and HO value by the estimated 
standard error. This computation can be expressed as follows: 
     t = [CAARt – 0] / [σt /N
1/2
] 
The σt in the above formula represents the estimated population standard deviation which has been calculated 
with the following equation: 
       N 





       i=1 
The CARit is the sum of ARit for a particular security i in the sample of N over an event period. N-1 refers to 
degree of freedom. The significance of CAAR has been tested at 5% and 1% levels. Two-tailed tests were used 
because the alternative hypothesis HA is not uni-directional. 
 
4. Results and Analysis of Findings 
The numerical findings of this research have been provided in table 1 and figure 1 respectively. On the initial 
formulation of null and alternative hypotheses no prediction of the direction of share price movement was made. 
In other words reactions could be in either direction. The focus of the study was simply whether the market 
reacts at the signal of the event or not on the day of the announcement and over short term of four plus one days 
time limit stipulated by DSE authority. However, AAR values on the event day and the day immediately 
following the event day were highly positive, suggesting market responded positively to the news. Thereafter 
AAR values for next three days were negative, but the absolute AAR values on these three days were quite small 
compared to the first two days. Day six AAR was positive again but absolute value was smaller than the event 
day and the day thereafter. Nevertheless, a two tailed t-test was done in order to be consistent with the 
hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Event Day of Share Purchase Announcement [0, 0] 
Both AAR and CAAR on the announcement day was 0.011891744 or 1.19% as per table 1. The corresponding t-
statistic of CAAR has been found to be 2.989829219.  This is significant at both 5% and 1% level of significance. 
Therefore, the finding here is that the security prices reacted positively on the event date and the null hypothesis 
has been rejected.  
 
4.2 Stipulated Days for Completing Share Purchase [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 3], [0, 4] 
On the first stipulated day CAAR was 0.018776876 with corresponding t-statistic of 3.418559325. The 
calculated t-statistic on this day is even higher than the one paralleling the event day. AAR being still positive, 
we can say that price continued to react positively and significantly on the day after the event day. Here again 
null hypothesis was rejected at both 5% and 1% significance level.  
On the second stipulated day CAAR was 0.018443321 which is slightly lower than the previous day due to 
negative AAR. However, the average abnormal return on this day, though negative, is immaterial at only 
0.0033%.  Resultantly, CAAR on the second stipulated day still proved to be significant at 5% level, although 
insignificant at 1% level.  Thus, for event window [0, 2] the null hypothesis has been rejected at 5% significance 
level but accepted at 1% significance level. 
On the remaining two days stipulated by the regulatory rules to complete the purchase of shares CAAR 
values were not significant at any level. As table 1 shows t-statistics corresponding to CAAR values on the third 
and the fourth days were insignificant at 5% level of significance, thus also at 1% level. This suggests that 
market reacts significantly on the first two days of the four days time limit to buy shares. But the reactions on the 
last two days have no significance. 
 
4.3 Day after Stipulated Period for Completing Share Purchase [0, 5] 
Day six has positive AAR. CAAR on this day is 0.020370619 or 2.04%. But this is insignificant if we compare 
calculated t-values to critical values. Thus it suggests that market has no reaction to the end of the share purchase 
period stipulated by the regulatory body. 
The above analysis suggests that the DSE market reacts positively and significantly upon announcement 
by directors of their intention to buy shares. But the actual purchase of shares by directors in next four days may 
not have any significant impact. This finding is based on gradual decrease of significance of CAAR over these 
four days and also because of the insignificance of CAAR on the day after the stipulated time limit to buy shares. 
However, the first day out of these four days has shown significant positive average abnormal return. This could 
be largely because of the repercussion effect of the announcement i.e. event day and not due to actual execution 
of the purchase of shares by directors. This suggests that the market takes more time to absorb corporate news. 
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The trading regulations of the DSE require all corporate insiders to notify any share purchase by them to the 
DSE authority beforehand. This notification is announced immediately on the DSE news website which can send 
signal to outside shareholders. This study has collected the dates of share purchase announcements by insiders 
from May 1, 2013 to April 30, 2014 and conducted an event study testing market reactions on the announcement 
date and subsequent five days. The first four of these five days is the time limit to complete the purchase. The 
results showed significant abnormal returns on the announcement date and subsequent two days. This may 
indicate outsiders are using signals from insider announcements to beat up price. It may also indicate insiders are 
targeting abnormal returns by predicting stock prices. But significant abnormal returns did not continue over the 
entire purchase period. So insiders actually may not be reaping abnormal returns over the actual four day 
purchase period. I found that only the first day of the purchase period showed significant positive AAR. But this 
could be due to the repercussion effect of the announcement date. If this is true then the conclusion is that the 
DSE reacts to directors’ announcements, but slowly, and the DSE does not react to actual purchase of shares by 
insiders. However, Aktas et al. (2007) also warned about two other possibilities in a short term study like this. 
First, there might be some endogenous link between abnormal returns and insider trading when insiders target 
particular purchase dates expecting abnormal returns. Second, insiders may have timed their announcement dates 
to hide some ulterior motives behind their purchase efforts because they could be privy to strategic information 
to their advantage to this end. Further research is needed to delve into the real interplay of these possible factors. 
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Table 1: AAR, CAAR and Hypothesis Testing 
Event 
Window 
AAR CAAR t - statistic Ho at 5% 
significance 
Ho at 1% 
significance 
[0, 0] 0.011891744 0.011891744 2.989829219 Reject Reject 
[0, 1] 0.006885132 0.018776876 3.418559325 Reject Reject 
[0, 2] -0.000333555 0.018443321 2.141797436 Reject Accept 
[0, 3] -0.002551790 0.015891531 1.689500450 Accept Accept 
[0, 4] -0.000922149 0.014969382 1.644871902 Accept Accept 




Figure 1: CAAR on Event Day [0, 0] and Post-Event Windows [0, t] 
 
 
